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In high energy and high intensity accelerators as the LHC, the energy stored in the 
beams is orders of magnitude above the damage level of accelerator components like 
magnets. Uncontrolled release of this energy can lead to serious damage of equipment 
and long machine downtimes. In order to cope with these potential risks Protection 
Systems were developed at CERN including two software systems: MCS 
(Management of Critical Settings) and RBAC (Role Based Access Control). RBAC 
provides an authentication and authorization facility for access to the critical parts of 
the control system. A second layer of security is provided by MCS which ensures that 
critical parameters are coherent within the software and hardware components and 
can only be changed by an authorized person. The MCS system is aimed at the most 
critical parameters in either potentially dangerous equipment or protection devices 
(e.g. Beam Loss Monitors). It is complementary to the RBAC infrastructure. Both 
systems are fully integrated in the control system for the LHC and SPS and were 
successfully commissioned already before first beam in the LHC. This paper will 
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Abstract 
 
In high energy and high intensity accelerators as the 
LHC, the energy stored in the beams is orders of 
magnitude above the damage level of accelerator 
components like magnets. Uncontrolled release of this 
energy can lead to serious damage of equipment and long 
machine downtimes. In order to cope with these potential 
risks Protection Systems were developed at CERN 
including two software systems: MCS (Management of 
Critical Settings) and RBAC (Role Based Access 
Control). RBAC provides an authentication and 
authorization facility for access to the critical parts of the 
control system. A second layer of security is provided by 
MCS which ensures that critical parameters are coherent 
within the software and hardware components and can 
only be changed by an authorized person. The MCS 
system is aimed at the most critical parameters in either 
potentially dangerous equipment or protection devices 
(e.g. Beam Loss Monitors). It is complementary to the 
RBAC infrastructure. Both systems are fully integrated in 
the control system for the LHC and SPS and were 
successfully commissioned already before first beam in 
the LHC. This paper will describe the MCS architecture, 
current status and its operational deployment in the LHC. 
INTRODUCTION 
For certain equipment systems, the interlock settings 
may be resident in the hardware and cannot be changed 
remotely. Nevertheless, many systems have to provide 
configurable interlock settings as they have to be 
calibrated or defined with beam during beam operation. In 
order to address these special needs, a specific solution 
was introduced: Management of Critical Settings (MCS) 
[1] which is nowadays an integral part of the control 
system for the LHC and SPS. MCS interfaces the 
repository of operational settings and implements a secure 
channel for changes of the interlock settings. 
MCS handles only the key machine protection related 
interlock settings, which should be modified infrequently, 
during initial commissioning, setting-up, recovery from 
interventions or after machine stops. It is not used for 
managing normal operational settings; it is aimed at the 
update of critical interlock settings which are normally 
considered as “almost locked”, providing maximum 
security against accidental or uncontrolled modification 
and strictly limiting the access to these critical settings.  
MCS ARCHITECTURE 
Overall Architecture 
The MCS infrastructure was integrated as part of the 
core of the control system for the LHC and SPS. The 
overall architecture including the data flow accompanying 
every modification of a critical property is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The overall MCS architecture. 
In the presentation tier, client applications running in 
the CERN Control Centre (CCC) trigger the modification 
of selected critical settings. This request is handled in the 
middle tier by the high-level control system called LHC 
Software Architecture (LSA) [5,6]. LSA is using the 
security services provided by the Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC) [2,3,4] system. In the lower tier, MCS 
integrates with the Front-End Software Architecture 
(FESA) [8] dedicated to the real-time control of the 
accelerator hardware. 
In the following paragraphs, introduced control sub-
systems are presented together with the detailed 
description of their integration within the MCS 
infrastructure. 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
Critical settings can compromise the safety of an 
accelerator, thus it is important to ensure that they can 
only be changed by an authorized equipment expert or 
trained personnel and not through uncontrolled access to 
the front-end machines. Moreover each expert should 
have the right to modify only a subset of the parameters 
within his or her domain of expertise. “Super users” 
cannot be allowed. These requirements were achieved by 
  
incorporating the authentication and authorization 
services provided by RBAC within MCS. 
 
  
Figure 2: RBAC in the control system. 
The security scheme in RBAC (see Fig. 2) is based on a 
concept of roles which are given to selected users and 
assigning permissions to roles (Access Rules) to access 
certain hardware properties. RBAC facilitates the 
authentication process by providing software login 
components for both Graphical User Interface (GUI) and 
non-GUI clients. Once the user is authenticated (Fig. 1, 
operation 1), a security credential called “RBA token” is 
generated which represents the user’s identity in the 
authorization process used with predefined Access Rules. 
In addition to RBAC’s authentication and authorization 
MCS provides a mechanism to guarantee data integrity at 
all times using the digital signatures. RBAC was extended 
to provide the management of the public/private key pairs 
(stored in the private, local Key Store) as part of the role 
management. The special MCS roles are associated with 
the public/private key pairs. The private keys are kept 
secret and never leave the RBAC server. The digital 
signatures are generated with the private key whenever 
LSA sends critical property data to the RBAC server with 
a request for signing, given that the client-side user has 
the required MCS role, according to the Access Rule for 
the critical property. The public keys are made available 
to front-ends, namely to FESA servers and other software 
processes to verify the MCS signature (see Fig. 1, 
operation 4) when critical properties are to be updated.  
 LHC Software Architecture (LSA) 
LSA is the core, 3-tier, high level controls framework 
for the LHC, SPS with its transfer lines and the LEIR 
accelerator. It provides advanced management of 
operational machine settings and covers all of the most 
important aspects of the accelerator controls: the optics 
configuration, the operational parameters space, the 
settings generation, the settings update (trim) and 
operational exploitation, hardware exploitation and beam 
based measurements. Moreover, it exposes a generic 
client API (Application Programming Interface) to all of 
its core functionality, which is used by the operational 
applications. 
Management of Critical Settings was introduced into 
the LSA framework as an extension to the existing 
system; particularly the Settings and Trim modules were 
adapted to the MCS requirements. The LSA database [7] 
is the master source for all the operational settings, 
including the critical ones. Moreover, information about a 
property being “Critical” must be registered in the LSA 
database which is facilitated through the LSA Parameter 
Configuration application. To fulfil the MCS 
requirements the LSA settings database model was 
extended in the two following areas: 
• An additional possible attribute for a property 
and related parameters: Critical 
• An additional data (setting) for a critical 
parameter, namely the digital signature computed for 
all the fields of a critical property. It is stored with 
the data. 
MCS within LSA can manage (sign and verify) any of 
the data types below:  
• Scalar values (integer, short, float, double, string) 
• Arrays of scalars 
• Two-dimensional arrays of scalars 
Any operation using LSA, including a change of a 
critical parameter, must be followed by creating and 
storing a new signature. Thus any of these typical LSA 
operations, providing the MCS mechanism below, require 
RBAC authentication and authorisation: 
• Generation of new settings 
• Trim (update) & Copy of an existing setting 
• Download of current settings to the equipment 
• Acquisition of hardware values into new, initial 
critical settings 
Once a modification (e.g. LSA trim or generation 
operation) of a critical setting is requested (see Figure 1, 
operation 2) the new settings values are calculated by the 
Trim module. The LSA Trim module which is used in all 
settings modifications deals with the additional 
requirements for the critical settings. All the “fields” of 
possibly complex critical properties have to be combined 
into a single message. This message is then sent to the 
RBAC server with the corresponding role as key 
identifier to get the signature back. The updated setting 
together with the signature is kept in the LSA database. 
Any person (not requiring the MCS role) can send the 
critical setting together with the signature to the front-end 
at any time afterwards. Only the data content signed with 
the role of the authorized person will be accepted on the 
front-end as discussed in the next section.  
Front-End Software Architecture (FESA) 
In the lower tier of the front-end computers (FECs), 
performing real-time control of the accelerator equipment, 
the FESA framework is deployed. FESA is an important 
component of the MCS infrastructure - the digital 
signature verification scheme is therefore an integral part 
of the FESA framework. After marking a property as 
Critical in the LSA database, an XML configuration file, 























corresponding public key is generated (using the LSA 
Parameter Configuration application) and made available 
to the front-end. The non-existence of this file, a partial 
bypass of MCS, can be detected at any time with LSA 
tools. With these XML files, FESA knows that it is 
dealing with critical properties and expects digital 
signatures for the properties defined in the configuration 
file, for each “set” command. If the signature is missing 
or the public key verification according to Fig. 3 fails, the 
setting is rejected.  A special effort had to be made to end 
up with the same digest functions on the signing side and 
front-end side for different platforms. 
 
Figure 3: MCS signature ver ification in FESA. The 
public key decrypts the received signature. The 
resulting digest function is compared with the digest 
function computed from the data on the front-end. If 
the compar ison is successful, the cr itical proper ty is 
updated on the front-end. 
INTEGRITY OF CRITICAL SETTINGS 
The XML files could be deleted on the front-ends, data 
on the front-ends can become corrupted due to for 
example radiation. As we are talking about machine 
protection relevant settings, in case of critical settings 
data integrity is of a great importance. Consistency checks 
were introduced to ensure the data integrity. These checks 
were implemented in the LSA Exploitation module. The 
“true” source is the LSA database, guaranteed by storing 
the signature with the data. Three tests are available:  
• Database check – checks consistency of the db 
critical settings with the db signature (uses public 
key signature verification algorithm) 
• Online check – checks consistency of the critical 
settings between the LSA database and the hardware  
• Frontend deployment check – checks if the MCS 
configuration file for a frontend exists and has the 
correct contents 
The MCS consistency checks can be triggered either on 
demand from the GUI application LSA Parameter 
Configuration or programmatically using the high level 
LSA API which exposes the different MCS checks as 
generic commands. The latter approach is already 
integrated with the LHC Sequencer [9], which was 
programmed to run the MCS checks before and during 
each LHC fill operation. Furthermore, the Software 
Interlock System [10] was also configured to execute the 
MCS checks for critical equipment systems during beam 
operation.   
MCS DEPLOYMENT IN LHC 
The safe running of the LHC will be partly due to 
highly reliable protection systems such as the Beam Loss 
Monitor System (4000 monitors with energy dependent 
thresholds), the Collimators (optics and beam position 
dependent collimator jaw interlock thresholds), the LHC 
Beam Dump System, the Beam Interlock System with its 
Safe Machine Parameters (e.g. probe intensity flag 
threshold), interlocked Beam Position Monitors and many 
more. All BLM thresholds, all collimator thresholds, the 
modifiable Safe Machine Parameters thresholds etc. are 
all managed by MCS. For the time being it is covering 
about 15 different hardware systems with some of them 
using 1000s of thresholds.   
CONCLUSIONS 
The Management of Critical Settings (MCS) is an 
integral part of the control system for the LHC and SPS, 
managing machine safety critical hardware and virtual 
parameters. It is using a state-of-the art Role Based 
Authentication and Authorization service together with 
Public/Private Key digital signatures to ensure data 
integrity at all times. MCS has been designed to protect 
the nominal path of data access with the aim to avoid 
operational errors and consequently long down times. It 
has been in use since 2007 and more and more systems in 
the LHC and also other accelerators at CERN make use of 
settings protected by MCS. 
REFERENCES 
[1] V.Kain et al., “Management of Critical Settings and 
Parameters for LHC Machine Protection Equipment”, 
CERN-LHC-CI-ES-0003, 2006, CERN, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
[2] S.R.Gysin et al., “Role-Based Access Control for the 
Accelerator Control System at CERN”, 
ICALEPCS’07, Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S.A.  
[3] K.Kostro et al., “Role-Based Authorization in 
Equipment Access at CERN”, ICALEPCS’07, 
Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S.A. 
[4] A.D.Petrov et al., “User Authentication for Role-
Based Access Control”, ICALEPCS’07, Knoxville, 
Tennessee, U.S.A. 
[5] M.Lamont et al., “LHC Era Core Control Application 
Software”, ICALEPCS’05, Geneva, Switzerland. 
[6] G.Kruk et al., “LHC Software Architecture (LSA) – 
Evolution toward LHC beam commissioning”, 
ICALEPCS’07, Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S.A. 
[7] C.Roderick et al., “The LSA Database to Drive the 
Accelerator Settings”, ICALEPCS’09, Kobe, Japan.  
[8] M.Arruat et al., “Front-End Software Architecture”, 
ICALEPCS’07, Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S.A.  
[9] V.Baggiolini et al., “A Sequencer For the LHC Era”, 
ICALEPCS’09, Kobe, Japan. 
[10] J.Wozniak et al., “Software Interlocks System”, 





















MCS Verification in FrontendMCS Digital Signature Generation
